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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from a district court judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs/Respondents 
State of Idaho and Idaho State Tax Commission (the "Plaintiffs"). The Plaintiffs initiated this 
civil action to prohibit Defendant/Appellant Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS") from 
selling and/or distributing cigarettes under the Master Settlement Agreement Act (the "MSAA"), 
Idaho Code §§ 39-7801, et seq., the Idaho Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act 
(the "Complementary Act"), Idaho Code §§ 39-8401, et seq., and the Idaho Consumer Protection 
Act, Idaho Code §§ 48-601, et seq. 
1. Statutory Background. 
On November 23, 1998, the four largest tobacco product manufacturers in the United 
States entered into a master settlement agreement with 46 states, including Idaho. State v. 
Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 524, 224 P.3d 1109, 1113 (20lO). The agreement was entered into 
based upon litigation between the states and the tobacco companies relating to the responsibility 
for the costs associated with the treatment of tobacco-related health concems. kl. The 
agreement required the participating tobacco companies ("Participating Manufacturers"), among 
other things, to pay substantial sums of money to the states based upon volume of sales. Id.; I.e. 
§ 39-7801(e). The agreement also required each participating state to enact and enforce a 
"qualifying statute" that "neutralizes the cost disadvantage" that the Participating Manufacturers 
would experience as a result of the master settlement agreement. Maybee, 148 Idaho at 524, 224 
P.3d at 1113. 
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To comply with the master settlement agreement's requirements, Idaho passed the 
MSAA, which required tobacco manufacturers to either: (1) join the agreement as signatories or 
(2) make payments to a qualified escrow account. Id. "Following passage of MSAA, the Idaho 
Legislature determined that cigarettes produced by Non-Participating Manufacturers were being 
sold in Idaho, without qualified escrow payments being made, and that additional measures were 
necessary to ensure compliance with the MSAA. As a result, the Complementary Act was 
passed in 2003." Id. 
The goal of the Complementary Act was to prevent "end-mns around the fee 
requirements of the [master settlement agreement] and the escrow requirement of the" MSAA, 
through the sale of cigarettes produced by Non-Patiicipating Manufacturers, who were not 
paying fees in accordance with the [agreement], and were not making escrow payments under 
the MSAA, and ensure that appropriate escrow funds are available to the states when needed to 
pay for medical expenses incurred due to tobacco-related health conditions, thereby protecting 
the public health." Id. at 524-25, 224 P.3d at 1113-14. To achieve this goal, the Complementary 
Act requires all tobacco manufacturers whose products are sold in Idaho to provide an annual 
certification to Idaho's attomey general certifying that the manufacturer has executed the MSA 
or is fully complying with the MSAA. I.e. § 39-8403. The Complementary Act further requires 
that the Idaho attomey general publish a Directory of Compliant Tobacco Product Manufacturers 
and Brand Families, listing all tobacco product manufacturers which have met their obligations 
under section 39-8403. 
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In the present case, Plaintiffs argue that NWS violated the MSAA and the 
Complementary Act by selling cigarettes in Idaho that are not listed on Idaho's Compliant 
Tobacco Manufacturer Directory. NWS submits that Idaho has no personal jurisdiction over it, 
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, and that the Complementary Act is 
in conflict with the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause of the United 
States Constitution. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On August 14, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against NWS. (R. p. 9). Plaintiffs 
asserted in their Complaint that Grand River had been enjoined from selling in Idaho, directly or 
indirectly, any of its brands of cigarettes, which include Opal and Seneca brands. (R. p. 16). 
Plaintiffs alleged that NWS sold a large amount of Opal and Seneca brand cigarettes from 2004 
to 2008 to retail outlets 1 located in Idaho in violation ofIdaho law. (R. p. 15). Plaintiffs further 
contended that NWS had sold cigarettes without a permit required by the Idaho cigarette tax laws 
and in violation of the MSAA and the Complementary Act. (R. p. 12). The Complaint requested 
a preliminary and permanent injunction and civil penalties against NWS. (R. pp. 19-20). 
On September 17, 2008, NWS removed the case to the United States District Court of 
Idaho. That court subsequently remanded the case back to the Idaho district court. (R. p. 2). 
On April 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction to prohibit NWS 
from engaging in conduct described in the Complaint. (R. p. 28). On May 6,2009, NWS filed a 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Personal Jurisdiction. (R. pp. 
I As noted above, NWS only sold cigarettes to Warpath, Inc., which only maintains one retail outlet in Plummer, 
Idaho. 
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101, 104, 119). Concurrently therewith, NWS moved to delay the hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Preliminary Injunction until NWS's Motion to Dismiss had been decided. (R. pp. 98-99). 
A hearing on the above motions was held by the district court on July 2, 2009, but issues 
were raised that prompted the district court to request fmiher briefing, which the parties supplied. 
(R. p. 545). Another hearing was held on December 17, 2009. (R. p. 664). By then, the Idaho 
Supreme Court had issued Maybee, 148 Idaho 520, 224 P.3d 1109,2 and the district court again 
requested further briefing relating to Maybee. (R. p. 792, 1. 25 - p. 793, 1. 2). 
On May 20,2010, the district court considered the issues fully briefed. (R. p. 792). The 
court first addressed and denied NWS's Motion to Dismiss on all three grounds. (R. p. 797,11. 
11-12, 22-26). The district court then granted Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 
(R. p. 799, 1. 15). At a hearing on August 24, 2010, the district court signed and issued the 
preliminary injunction order enjoining and restraining NWS from engaging in the conduct 
described in the verified complaint. (R. p. 1063); (T. p. 119,11. 23-25). 
On June 24, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. pp. 804, 806, 
820). The hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was held on October 26, 2010. 
(R. p. 1062-63); (T. pp. 138, 176-77). At the hearing, NWS moved to strike certain affidavits 
proffered by Plaintiffs as presenting inadmissible evidence. (T. p. 153). The district court then 
took the matter under advisement without TIlling on the motion. 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by the district court on November 
26,2010. (R. p. 1064). The court concluded that NWS was subject to regulation and taxation 
2 Maybee is discussed in detail in section IV.A.l.b, infra. 
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and had violated Idaho's cigarette regulation. (R. p. 1075, 1. 13). Pursuant to I.C. § 39-8403(3), 
the district court pennanently enjoined NWS from selling noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho or 
from engaging in business as a wholesaler without obtaining a valid cigarette tax pennit. (R. p. 
1078,11. 10-12); (Pennanent Injunction Order, R. 1097-98, December 13, 2010). The district 
court, however, postponed granting Plaintiffs' request for a civil penalty until a hearing on the 
civil penalty could be held. (R. p. 1081,11. 19-20). 
On December 29, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their memorandum supporting their Motion for 
Civil Penalties. (R. pp. 1103). A hearing was held on Plaintiffs' Motion for Civil Penalties on 
February 8,2011. (R. p. 1161). The district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Civil Penalty on March 9, 2011, and imposed a penalty against NWS in the amount of 
$214,200.00. (R. pp. 1163-67). 
While NWS filed an initial notice of appeal on January 19, 2011, Plaintiffs' request for 
civil penalty had not been resolved and a final judgment had not been entered. (R. p. 1120). On 
March 31, 2011, a judgment was entered that disposed of all pending motions and claims, except 
costs and attorney fees. (R. p. 1169-70). NWS filed this timely notice of appeal on May 5, 
2011. (R.p.ll72). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. ("Grand River") is a Canadian corporation that 
produces, packages, and sells tobacco products. (R. p. 121, Aff. Arthur Montour ~ 3). Grand 
River is wholly owned by members of the Six Nations tribes which comprise the Iroquois 
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Confederacy. It is located on the Grand River Reserve in Oshweken, Ontario, Canada. Grand 
River manufactures Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes. (R. p. 52, Aff Beth Kittelmann ~ '3). 
Native Wholesale Supply Company ("NWS") is chartered under the tribal code of the 
Sac and Fox Tribe. (R. p. 121, Aff. Arthur Montour ~ 2). NWS's president and sole owner is 
Arthur Montour, a tribal member of the Seneca Nation. (R. p. 120, Aff. Montour ~ 1). NWS's 
principal place of business is located on the Seneca Nation reservation. (R. pp. 121-22, Aff. 
Montour ~ 2). NWS has no presence in the state of Idaho, nor does it advertise or solicit in 
Idaho. (R. p. 122, Aff. Montour,r 7). NWS is a cigarette wholesaler and buys cigarettes from 
Grand River for sale to retailers. (R. p. 121, Aff Montour,r 3). All purchases and imports from 
Grand River are shipped to a bonded warehouse on the Seneca Nation reservation or a Foreign 
Trade Zone warehouse. (R. p. 121, Aff. Montour ~ 4). NWS only sells the cigarettes to tribes or 
entities located on tribal land and owned by Indians. (R. p. 120, Aff Montour '1 5). All orders 
are placed and processed from NWS's headquarters on the Seneca Nation reservation. (R. p. 
121, Aff Montour ~ 5). All cigarettes are marked "for reservation sales only," and all cigarettes 
are sold with title and risk of loss deemed as transferring to the purchaser at the time of the sale 
on the Seneca Nation reservation. (R. p. 122, Aff. Montour ~~ 5,6). NWS does not exercise any 
control over its products subsequent to their sale to third parties. (R. p. 122, Aff. Montour'l6). 
Warpath, Inc., an Idaho corporation, is owned by registered members of the Coeur 
d' Alene tribe. CR. p. 456). Warpath's articles of incorporation prohibit anyone other than Coeur 
d' Alene tribal members from owning an interest. (R. p. 456). Warpath's only location is on the 
Coeur d'Alene reservation, in Plummer, Idaho. (R. pp. 456, 459). The Coeur d'Alene 
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reservation shares a border with the state of Washington and otherwise is located within the 
boundary of the state of Idaho. (R. p. 459). Warpath is the only Idaho cigarette ret~iler which 
purchased cigarettes from NWS. 
On September 5, 2002, the Ada County District Court entered a default judgment against 
Grand River for failing to comply with the MSAA. (R. p. 63). The judgment included an 
injunction that prohibited Grand River from selling cigarettes in Idaho. (R. p. 64). 
Warpath ordered Seneca and Opal cigarettes, manufactured by Grand River, from NWS. 
(R. 15). A non-Indian retailer located off a reservation would be prohibited from purchasing or 
offering for sale these cigarettes under Idaho law.3 The tenns of the sale were FOB Seneca 
Nation and the cigarettes were marked "for reservation sales only." (R. pp. 121-22, ,-r,-r 4-6). The 
cigarettes that were sold to Warpath were held in the Foreign Trade Zone in Las Vegas, Nevada 
prior to their sale to Warpath on the Coeur d'Alene reservation.4 (R. 793). Warpath is the only 
customer NWS has on the Coeur d' Alene reservation, and NWS has never sold cigarettes to any 
other customer in Indian Country in Idaho or directly to any customer in Idaho. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs? 
2. Did the district court err in not granting NWS's motion to dismiss? 
3. Did the district comi err in granting an injunction and civil penalties to Plaintiffs? 
4. Did the district court err in granting attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs? 
3 The Plaintiffs have not filed a complaint against, or sought any redress from, Warpath, Inc. 
4 The Foreign Trade Zone required all sales to be directed to Indian nation companies and all cigarettes were to be 
marked for reservation distribution only. (R. pp. 321-22). 
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III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
NWS is entitled to an award of attomey fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-117(1) and 
12-121. As demonstrated by the briefing, Plaintiffs' conduct has been in direct conflict with the 
express language of the Idaho Constitution and statutes delineating the state of Idaho's 
jurisdiction in Indian Country. The Coeur d' Alene tribe has not consented to the state of Idaho 
exercising its jurisdiction or authority in this area. Plaintiffs' actions in bringing this .action and 
defending this appeal are frivolous, umeasonable, and without foundation. I.e. § 12-121; Utter 
v. Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361, 367, 48 P.3d 1250, 1256 (2002). Therefore, NWS is entitled to 
attorney fees under I. e. § § 12-117 and 12-121. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED NWS'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
1. Clarification of Issue 
NWS is challenging the district cOUli's decision in granting Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying NWS's Motion to Dismiss. NWS submits that the district 
court's decisions were incorrect based upon three closely related but independent legal 
arguments: (1) the Complementary Act, as applied to Native Americans, is preempted by 
Federal law; (2) Idaho does not have subject matter jurisdiction to regulate the trade of tobacco 
in Indian Country; and (3) NWS is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. Before NWS's 
argument is presented, NWS has set forth a brief overview of tribal sovereign immunity and why 
this Court's decision in Maybee is not controlling in the present case. The standard of review for 
both a grant of summary judgment and a denial of a motion to dismiss is also discussed below. 
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a) Overview of Tribal Sovereign Immunity. 
TIlls case involves whether Idaho has the ability to regulate and tax the tobacco trade that 
occurs solely between Indians on Indian Country. As such, a review of Indian law and tlibal sovereign 
iIwnUlllty is helpful before analyzing the facts ofthis case. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established that Indian tIibes possess "the 
common-law immunity from suit traditionally eltioyed by sovereign powers." Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). The United States Supreme Court has stated that this common-law 
iInmunity "is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance." Three Affiliated Tribes 
of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986). Absent a clear and 
unequivocally expressed waiver of sovereign llnmunity, Indian tIibes are not subject to civil suit in any 
state, federal, or arbitral tribunal. C & L Enter. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 
532 U.S. 411, 418 (2001). Sovereign immunity presents a jurisdictional question and absent a 
waiver, presents an absolute bar to suits against tribes. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Tech, Inc., 523 U.S. 
751, 754 (1998); Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. Of Equalization, 757 F.2d 
1047, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 1985). 
Indian tribal sovereign immunity extends beyond the tribe itself: "Indian tribes retain 
attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory." White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). Tribal members retain their status "as a separate 
people, with the power of regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought 
under the laws of the Union or of the states within whose limits they resided .... " McClanahan 
v. Arizona State Tax Comm 'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973). Accordingly, "there is no rigid rule by 
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which to resolve the question whether a particular state law may be applied to an Indian 
reservation or to tribal members." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 142. "When on reservation conduct 
involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the state's 
regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal 
self-government is at its strongest." Id. at 144 (emphasis added). Conversely, "where ... a 
State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on the reservation," 
then "more difficult questions arise." Id. These questions are answered by examining "the 
language of the relevant federal treaties and statutes in terms of both the broad policies that 
underlie them and the notions of sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of 
tribal independence." Id. at 144-45. 
The Supreme Court has enunciated "two independent but related barriers to the assertion 
of state regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members." Id. "First, the exercise of 
such authority may be pre-empted by federal law." Id., citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. 
Arizona Tax Comm 'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). "Second, (the assertion of state regulatory 
authority) may unlawfully infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws 
and be ruled by them." Id.; see also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,220 (1959). 
As to the first barrier to state regulatory authority, "[t)he tradition of Indian sovereignty 
must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority has been pre-empted by 
operation of federal law." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143. "[T]his tradition is reflected and 
encouraged in a number of congressional enactments demonstrating a firm federal policy of 
promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." Id. The congressional declarations 
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of policy in the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.c. §§ 1451 et seq., and in the Indian Self-
Detennination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 US.c. §§ 450 et seq., are p31iicularly 
signific311t: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of congress ... to help develop and utilize 
Indian resources, both physical and hmnan, to a point where the Indians will iillly 
exercise responsibility for the utilization 3l1d management of their own resources 
and where they will enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts 
comparable to that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities. 
25 US.c. § 1451. Moreover, Congress has declared "its commitment to the mainten311Ce of the federal 
govennnent's unique and continuing relationship with 3l1d responsibility to the Indi311 people through 
the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will pennit an orderly 
tr311sition ii-om federal domination of progr3l11s for 3l1d services to Indi311s to effective and me31TIngful 
participation by the Indian people in the pI muTIng, conduct, and administration of those programs and 
services." 25 US.c. § 450(a)(b). Accordingly, in order to find that state regulation is preempted 
by operation of federal law in the field of federal Indian law, an express congressional statement 
to that effect is not required. Bracker, 448 US. at 143. The foregoing analysis requires a 
"particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry 
designed to detennine, whether in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would 
violate federal law." Id. at 145. 
The United States Supreme Court has also applied a categorical bar to civil regulation of tribal 
commercial activity on Indian Country. In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of 
Flathead Reservation, 425 US. 463 (1976), the state of Montana sought to collect cigarette 3l1d 
personal property taxes from reservation Indians who purchased cigarettes from an on-reservation 
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"smoke shop" owned and operated by tribal members. See Moe, 425 US. at 467-68. The Court noted 
that the question whether states had authority to tax the on-reservation activities of Indians had been 
"la[id] to rest" in the negative by the Court's decision in McClanahan, 411 US. 164. Moe, 425 US. at 
476 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973)). The Supreme Court also 
refused to allow the state to charge vendor fees to on-reservation Indians. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental principle that 
states may not regulate tribal commercial activity occurring inside Indian Country. In Oklahoma Tax 
Comm. v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 US. 114, 128 (1993), the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma could 
not impose income taxes or motor vehicle taxes on tribal members who lived in Indian COlll1try. In 
Oklahoma Ta)( Comm. v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 US. 450, 453 (1995), the Supreme ,Court held 
Oklahoma could not tax the retail sale of gas on a reservation to non-Indians because the legal 
incidence ofthe tax fell on tribal members. The Court stated in pati: 
But when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an Indian tribe 
or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-Indians, 
we have employed, instead of a balancing inquiry, "a more 
categorical approach: '[A]bsent cession of jurisdiction or other 
federal statutes pennitting it,' we have held, a State is without 
power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians." Taking 
this categorical approach, we have held unenforceable a number of 
state taxes whose legal incidence rested on a tribe or on tribal 
members inside Indian country. 
Chickasaw Nation, 515 US. at 459 (citations omitted). As the Oklahoma Tax Comm. v. Citizen Band 
Potawatomi Indian Tribe a/Oklahoma, 498 US. 505, 510 (1991), Court recognized, this categOlical 
bar to such regulations is simply honOling tlibal sovereign immunity: 
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A doctrine of Indian tribal sovereign immunity was 
originally enunciated by this Court and has been reaffirmed in a 
number of cases. Congress has always been at liberty to dispense 
with such tribal immunity or to limit it. Although Congress has 
occasionally authorized limited classes of suits against Indian 
tribes, it has never authorized suits to enforce tax assessments. 
Instead, Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the 
immunity doctrine. See, e.g., Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 
Stat. 77, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 Stat. 2203, 25 
U.S.C. § 450 et seq. These Acts reflect Congress' desire to promote 
the "goal of Indian self-government, including its 'overriding goal' 
of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development." 
Under these circumstances, we are not disposed to modify the 
long-established principle oftribal sovereign immunity. 
Finally, the United States Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized that there is a 
significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains highly 
relevant to the pre-emption inquiry; though the reservation boundary is not absolute, it remains 
an important factor to weigh in determining whether state authority has exceeded pemlissible 
limits." Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151. "Indian nations ... long have been distinct political 
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive." Sac and 
Fox Nation, 508 U.S. at 123. The "presumption against state taxing authority applies to all 
Indian Country .... " Id. at 126. Where an activity is sought to be regulated, the court must 
"analyze the relevant treaties and federal statutes against the backdrop of Indian sovereignty" in 
considering the activity to be regulated. Id. 
"In light of the unique sovereign status ofIndian tribes located in [Idaho]," it is clear that 
the state of Idaho "carmot tax cigarettes sold on an Indian reservation to tribal members for their 
own use, unless authorized to do so by Congress." Keweenaw Bay Indian Community v. Rising, 
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477 F.3d 881, 883 (6th CiT. 2007), citing Wagnon v. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians, 546 
u.s. 95 (2005). "The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority over 
relations with Indian tribes ... , and in recognition of sovereignty retained by Indian tribes even 
after fonnation of the United States, Indian tribes and individuals are generally exempt from 
state taxation within their own territory." Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 455 (quoting Montana 
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)). Where, as here, the tax scheme has some effect on 
an Indian tribe, "[t]he initial and frequently dispositive question ... is who bears the legal 
incidence of [the] tax." Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 99 (2005) 
("States are categorically barred from placing the legal incidence of an excise tax on a tribe or on 
tribal members for sales made inside Indian country") (citations omitted). 
b) State v. Maybee, 148 Idaho 520,224 P.3d 1109 (2010), Is Not Controlling. 
In Maybee, a case with similarities to the one at bar, this COUli recently analyzed tribal 
sovereign immunity. The Maybee decision was entered while the present case was pending. 
Maybee is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and not controlling. Therefore, the district 
court was incorrect in concluding "that the Maybee decision is controlling." (R. p. 1073). 
In Maybee, the defendant Native American resided on an Indian reservation located in 
New York. Maybee, 148 Idaho at 526,224 P.3d at 1115. The defendant sold cigarettes in Idaho 
over the intemet. Id. In 2006, the Idaho Attorney General wrote a cease and desist letter to the 
defendant and later filed suit against the defendant for violations of the Complementary Act and 
the MSAA. Id. The district cOUli ultimately ruled in favor of the Idaho Attorney General and 
the defendant appealed. Id. at 527, 224 P.3d at 1116. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 14 
00399771001 
On appeal, the defendant challenged whether the Complementary Act and the MSAA 
regulated cigarettes of units sold, and argued that he was not subject to the acts because he was 
located in New York and that the Interstate Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause 
preempt the Complementary Act and the MSAA. See generally id. This Court rejected each of 
these arguments and ruled in favor of the Idaho Attorney General on appeal. 
First, it must be noted that Maybee does not offer any guidance in the present case 
because neither the facts nor the arguments are the same. The defendant in lvJaybee sold 
cigarettes in Idaho over the internet. Id. at 526, 224 P.3d at 1115. Customers not located on a 
reservation could therefore buy the defendant's cigarettes. Based upon these facts, the Indian 
Commerce Clause was not applicable when the defendant accepted orders from, and sent 
cigarettes to, consumers who were off reservation. Id. at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123. This Court 
specifically noted in the Maybee decision that "the Acts do not regulate ... on-reservation 
activities," but instead regulated the defendant's "off-reservation conduct of: (1) selling, and 
offering for sale, Noncompliant Cigarettes in Idaho." Id. (emphasis added). The Maybee Court 
essentially rejected the defendant's arguments because the cigarette sales and interactions with 
customers went beyond the boundaries of Indian Land. In the present case, the sales in question 
are between Native Americans located on Indian Land. This is a crucial distinction based upon 
the Maybee Court's analysis of the Indian Commerce Clause and the doctrine of preemption, 
which this Court summarized as follows: 
In determining how to analyze any state statute that 
allegedly is in conflict with the Indian Commerce Clause, it is 
crucial to determine, as a preliminary inquiry: (1) whether the 
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regulated conduct occurs on or off a reservation; (2) whether or not 
the party being regulated is a tribal member; and (3) if the conduct 
being regulated does occur on a reservation, whether State interests 
outside the reservation are implicated . 
. " Conversely, "[ w ]hen on-reservation conduct involving 
only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the 
state's regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal 
interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." . 
" The cases that the Supreme Court has deemed the most difficult 
are those in which a state seeks to regulate the activities of a non-
Indian engaging in activities upon a reservation; in that instance 
the Court employs a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the 
state, federal, and tribal interest at stake, an inquiry designed to 
detennine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state 
authority would violate federal law." 
Id. Based upon this language, and this Court's holding that "the Acts do not regulate ... on-
reservation activities," the present case is not difficult. The regulated conduct here occurs on a 
reservation, and the p31iies being regulated are tribe members. Accordingly, Idaho state law is 
inapplicable because Idaho's "interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in 
encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest." 
b) Standard of Review (Summary Judgment). 
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court uses the 
same standard properly employed by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Goodman 
Oil Co. of Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm, 136 Idaho 53, 55, 28 P.3d 996, 998 (2001). A 
party should be granted summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." LR.C.P. 56(c). 
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"Constitutional issues and the construction and application of legislative acts are pure 
questions of law over which this Court exercises free review." Struhs v. Protection Tec..hnologies, 
Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 718, 992 P.2d 164, 167 (1999). "[T]his Court is not bound by findings of 
the district court, but is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented." Mutual 
of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851,852,908 P.2d 153,154 (1995). 
c) Standard of Review (Motion to Dismiss). 
In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court applies the same standard as when it reviews an appeal from an 
order of summary judgment. Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 74-75, 803 P.2d 
978, 980-81 (1990). 
Subject matter jurisdiction, on the other hand, is so fundamental that it cannot be waived 
or consented to, and a court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction 
over a case. Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305,308 (2007); see Idaho R. Civ. P. 
12(g)(4). Appellate courts exercise free review over questions of jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 
150 Idaho 158, 163,244 P.3d 1244, 1249 (2010). 
2. The MSAA and the Complementary Act, as applied to Native Americans on 
Reservations, are Preempted by Federal Law. 
NWS submits that Idaho's regulatory scheme for the sale of tobacco products in Indian 
Country has been preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause and interpretations of federal law. 
Preemption is unique from subject matter jurisdiction, because a state that has already been 
granted jurisdiction may still have its regulations in Indian Country preempted by federal law. 
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Based upon this law, the district court clearly erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment and denying NWS's Motion to Dismiss. 
The Indian Commerce Clause arises from the same constitutional text as the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. Article I, Section 8, clause 3, of the United States Constitution grants 
Congress the power "[tJo regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes." The Indian Corrunerce 
Clause provides Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs. Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 US. 163, 192 (1989). The US. Supreme Court is tasked 
with interpreting the Indian Commerce Clause and federal regulation of Indian Country across 
all states where tribes entered unique treaties with both the United States and individual states, 
which may have different civil and criminal subject matter jurisdiction over tribes. It is easy to 
understand why the Supreme Court warned that "generalizations on this subj ect have' become 
treacherous." Bracker, 448 US. at 141 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 US. 
145, 148 (1973)). 
"The semi-independent position of the Indian tribes, coupled with the power of Congress 
to regulate tribal affairs has caused the Supreme Court to find that there are two ways in which 
State regulation over tribal reservations and members can violate the Indian Commerce Clause." 
Maybee, 148 Idaho at 533, 224 P.3d at 1122 (citing Bracker, 448 US. at 142 (addressing 
preemption of Arizona's tax on non-Indian activities in Indian Country)). First, a state cmmot 
regulate Indian Country where such regulation is preempted by federal law. Second, states may 
not infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Id. 
Preemption does not require an express congressional statement, and a state regulation should be 
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given consideration. Id. at 534, 224 P.3d at 1123. In analyzing any state statute it is crucial to 
determine: (1) whether the regulated conduct occurs on or off a reservation; (2) whether the 
party being regulated is a tribal member; and (3) if the conduct being regulated does occur on a 
reservation, whether State interests outside the reservation are implicated. Id. 
One rule of thumb that can be gleaned from the U.S. Supreme Court cases is that the key 
factor in determining whether a regulation or tax is preempted by federal law under the Indian 
Commerce Clause is whether the legal incidence of the law falls upon an Indian or upon a non-
Indian. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 458 ("when a State attempts to levy a tax directly on an 
Indian tribe or its members inside Indian country, rather than on non-Indians, we have ,employed, 
instead of a balancing inquiry, a more categorical approach: Absent cession of jurisdiction or 
other federal statutes permitting it, we have held, a State is without power to tax reservation 
lands and reservation Indians.") (quotation omitted). Where the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed 
state regulation of tobacco, the legal incidence fell on non-Indians. In Washillgton v. 
Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 144 (1980), the 
Washington taxing ordinances specified that the tax was to be passed on to the ultimate 
consumer of the cigarettes. The district court found, and the Supreme Court accepted the 
finding, that the legal incidence of the tax was on the purchaser in transactions between an Indian 
seller and a non-Indian buyer. Id. at 142, 142 n.9. The Court summarized its analysis from !vIae, 
425 U.S. 463, where Montana sought to impose a cigarette tax on smokeshops operated by tribal 
members. The Colville Court explained that it "upheld the tax insofar as sales to non-Indians 
were concerned, because its legal incidence fell on the non-Indian purchaser." 447 U.S. at 150-
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51. The Colville Court concluded that federal law had not preempted state sales and cigarette 
taxes otherwise collectible from non-Indians. Id. at 156. 
In Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 452-53,458, the Court addressed whether Oklahoma 
could impose its motor fuels excise tax on fuel sold by the Chickasaw Nation retail stores located 
on tribal trust land to Indians and non-Indians. The Court stated: 
The initial and frequently dispositive question in Indian tax cases, 
therefore, is who bears the legal incidence of a tax. If the legal 
incidence of an excise tax rests on a tribe or on tribal members for 
sales made inside Indian country, the tax cam10t be enforced absent 
clear congressional authorization. 
Id. at 458-59. If the legal incidence falls on non-Indians and the balance of federal, state, and 
tribal interests favors the state, then the state may impose a regulation with minimal burdens. Id. 
at 459 (citing Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. at 154-57). The legal 
incidence inquiry is not based on who bears the economic burden but is one of fair interpretation 
of the taxing statute as written and applied. Id. at 461. The Court examined factors sqch as who 
collects the tax, when the tax is assessed, whether a party is no more than a transmittal agent for 
the taxes, and whether a party can set off liability when the good cam10t be sold. Id. at 461-62. 
Further, the Court identified as a significant factor: which party's actions are prohibited for 
failing to comply with the regulation. Id. at 462. The Court noted that there were no 
prohibitions on consumers purchasing or possessing untaxed fuel, but it was unlawful for 
distributors or retailers to sell or offer for sale untaxed fuel. Id. The Court found that the legal 
incidence of the tax fell upon the retailer and affirmed the court of appeals' determination that 
the state's regulation was preempted. Id. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently, and appropriately, focused and placed 
emphasis on where the legal burden of the regulation falls. In Goodman Oil, 136 Idaho at 54,28 
P.3d at 997, Goodman Oil transported fuel from Spokane, Washington to the border of the Coeur 
d'Alene reservation for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe, without entering Idaho. The tribe purchased 
the gasoline at the border of the state and then a sister corporation of Goodman Oil hauled the 
gasoline onto the Coeur d'Alene reservation to the tribe-owned gas station. The Idaho Tax 
Commission assessed Goodman Oil a deficiency for failing to collect taxes on the fuel sold to the 
tribe and in tum sold to tribal members. The district court held the tax against Goodman Oil was 
not allowed. This Court looked at the statute to divine whether the legal incidence of the tax fell 
on a tribe or tribal members. Id. at 60, 28 P.3d at 1003 ("If the legal incidence of an excise tax 
rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian Country, the tax cannot be 
enforced absent clear congressional authorization.") (quoting Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 
459). The legal incidence of the regulation may be distinct from the economic burden and, 
absent clear language in the statute, is detennined from a fair interpretation of the statute. Id. 
While the district court found the legal incidence fell on the Indian consumers, the Court saw the 
incidence falling on the tribal retailer. Id. at 61, 28 P.3d at 1004. The Court affinned the district 
court's prohibition on the tax. Id. 
In Mahoney v. State, 96 Idaho 59, 60, 524 P.2d 187, 188 (1974), Idaho sought to impose 
a sales tax on the sale of cigarettes on a retailer owned by a Coeur d'Alene tribal member that 
was located on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. This Court looked at where the incidence of the 
tax fell and identified it as falling on the Indian retailer. The Court stated: "the incidence of the 
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tax falls squarely upon sales by an Indian on a reservation; this tax is nothing less than a direct 
tax upon commerce with the Indian tribes, and 'such taxation is not pennissible absent 
congressional consent. '" Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 64, 524 P.2d at 192. The Court held that "[i]n 
the absence of congressional consent, the Idaho State Tax Commission had no jurisdiction to tax 
the on-reservation sale of cigarettes by an Indian seller, whether the purchasers were Indians or 
non-Indians." Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 67,524 P.2d at 195 (citing U.S. Const. Art. I. § 8, cl. 3). 
In the present case, NWS is in the same position as the wholesaler in Goodman Oil and 
the retailer in Mahoney. 5 The MSAA explicitly states its purpose is to impose the financial 
burden on tobacco product manufacturers. I.e. § 39-7801(d). The goal of the MSA.i\ is to set up 
a reserve fund for tobacco manufacturers that will be available in the future as a source for Idaho 
to recover in the event the manufacturer is found culpable. I.e. § 39-7801(f). The MSAA only 
regulates manufacturers. The Complementary Act supplements the MSAA and makes it 
unlawful for any person: 
(a) To affix a stamp to a package or other container of cigarettes 
of a tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in 
the directory; 
(b) To sell, offer or possess for sale in this state, cigarettes of a 
tobacco product manufacturer or brand family not included in the 
directory; 
(c) To acquire, hold, own, possess, transport, import, or cause to 
be imported cigarettes that the person knows or should know are 
intended for distribution or sale in the state in violation of this 
subsection (3). 
5 The legal incidence of the MSAA and the Complementary Act falls on the wholesalers and retailers, who in this 
case are tribal members, and cannot be simply expressed as enforcing a state law applicable to consumers, such as 
those at issue in Moe and Confederated Tribes of the Colville. 
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I.C. § 39-8403(3). There is no prohibition in the MSAA or the Complementary Act against 
purchasing and consuming cigarettes that are non-compliant with the act. The legal incidence of 
the Complementary Agreement clearly does not fall upon the consumer, but on the :vholesaler 
and the retailer. As noted in Goodman Oi( the Complementary Act cannot be enforced because 
the "legal incidence ... rests on a tribe or on tribal members for sales made inside Indian 
country." This outcome is also supported by Mahoney: "[i]n the absence of congressional 
consent, the Idaho State Tax Commission [has] no jurisdiction to tax the on-reservation sale of 
cigarettes by an Indian seller, whether the purchasers were Indians or non-Indians." 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that the regulated conduct occurred on reservation 
and the parties being regulated are tribal members. Businesses exclusively owned by tribal 
members are considered Indians in analyzing whether Idaho can regulate the transaction. 
l'vlahoney, 96 Idaho at 61, 524 P.2d at 189 (holding the state could not tax cigarettes sold by a 
business owned by Coeur d'Alene member). The business need not be connected with tribal 
business, and the owner does not need to be engaged in performing a tribal function for the 
business to be treated as an Indian. !d. NWS is owned exclusively by a tribal member, and 
NWS sold cigarettes on the reservation. Warpath is owned exclusively by Coeur d'Alene 
members, and it bought the cigarettes and then offered them for sale on its reservation. -Because 
Plaintiffs in this case are seeking to regulate the on-reservation conduct of Indians, the regulation 
cannot be enforced without congressional authorization. Goodman Oil, 136 Idaho at 60, 28 P.3d 
at 1003. Thus, the district court's judgment must be reversed. 
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While the district court stated that the activities in this case constitute off-reservation 
conduct similar to the Maybee case (R. p. 1072, 1. 12), the record at the summary judgment stage 
does not support such a finding. In Maybee, 148 Idaho at 526,224 P.3d at 1115, the defendant, a 
tribal member, was shipping cigarettes from his reservation directly to consumers in Idaho who 
may not have been located on a reservation located within Idaho. There is no indication in 
A1aybee that any of the sales by the defendant went to tribal members located on a reservation. 
Here, the evidence is undisputed that the conduct at issue is trade between Indians located on a 
reservation. While Idaho may desire to prevent its consumers from buying unregulated 
cigarettes, based upon Mahoney and Goodman Oil, the state must direct its regulation at the 
consumer rather than at the Indian entities. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and denying NWS's Motion to Dismiss. 
3. Idaho Does Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Regulate the Trade of 
Tobacco in Indian Country. 
NWS submits that Idaho courts and the state of Idaho lack subject matter jurisdiction to 
regulate the tobacco trade occurring in Indian Country. The Idaho Constitution and 
complementary jurisdictional statutes prohibit Idaho from exercising subject matter jurisdiction 
over Indian Country with narrow exceptions or where the tribe has consented to Idaho exercising 
jurisdiction. Here, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Coeur d'Alene tribe consented to 
Idaho exercising jurisdiction over the tobacco trade conducted exclusively within the Coeur 
d' Alene reservation. Plaintiffs cannot unilaterally assert subject matter jurisdiction in this case in 
the face of the Idaho Constitution. 
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The subject matter jurisdiction of the Idaho legislature, the executive branch, and the 
judiciary are governed by the Idaho Constitution, Idaho statutes, and Idaho rules. Th: source of 
this power comes from a number of provisions. For instance, Article V, Section 20 of the Idaho 
Constitution provides that district courts "shall have original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law 
and in equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 
at 162-63, 244 P.3d at 1248-49. In the courts, "[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the l?ower to 
detennine cases over a general type or class of dispute." Bach, 144 Idaho at 145, 158 P.3d at 
308, The Constitution may exclusively grant this jurisdiction to one branch of government or it 
may grant jurisdiction and allow the legislature to regulate it "as may be conferred by law." 
Idaho Const. Art. X § 5; Urrabazo, 150 Idaho at 162, 244 P.3d at 1249; Idaho Const. Art. V § 
20; Laughy v. Idaho Dept. ofTransp., 149 Idaho 867,870,243 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2010). Unless 
mandated otherwise by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the ultimate authority for 
defining the jurisdiction for all entities within the state ofIdaho is the Idaho Constitution. 
Section 19, Article XXI of the Idaho Constitution states: 
And the people of the State ofIdaho do agree and declare that we 
forever disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated public 
lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to all lands lying 
within said limits owned or held by any Indians or Indian tribes; 
and until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the 
United States, the same shall be subject to the disposition of the 
United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United 
States . ... 
(emphasis added). The Idaho Constitution "is not a grant of, but is a limitation on, the powers of 
the state, and that our Legislature may provide for that which is not prohibited." Lloyd Corp. v. 
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Bannock County, 53 Idaho 478, 25 P.2d 217,219 (1933) (interpreting the Idaho Code consistent 
with the Constitution). "[T]he Idaho Constitution acts as a limit on the state's legislature, unlike 
the United States Constitution, which enumerates the powers held by Congress. Thus, our 
legislature may make any law that is not unconstitutional, rather than only having the power to 
legislate on matters enumerated in the Idaho Constitution." Gibson v. Bennett, 141 Idaho 270, 
276, 108 P.3d 417, 423 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing Flores v. State, 109 Idaho 182, 183, 706 P.2d 71, 
72 (Ct. App. 1985)). Considering the founding fathers' use of the phrase "absolute jurisdiction" 
in comparison to the other areas where the word jurisdiction is used; see Art. V, §§ 2, 9,13,20, a 
reasonable interpretation of this provision, which NWS encourages this Court to adopt, is that 
unless federal law mandates Idaho taking jurisdiction of a matter, Idaho must amend the Idaho 
Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over Indian Country. Congress has already consented to 
Idaho amending our Constitution to "remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil or 
criminal jurisdiction." 25 U.S.C. § 1324. Whether a state constitution must be amended to 
accept jurisdiction over Indian Country is a matter of state law. Washington v. Confederated 
Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463,493 (1979); but see State v. Marek, 112 
Idaho 860, 866, 736 P.2d 1314, 1320 (1987) (holding amendment of Idaho Constitution 
urmecessary if the legislature enacts statutes within the authority granted by Congress). 
Congress enacted a statute to cede subject matter jurisdiction on specific types or classes 
of disputes in Indian Country to Idaho ifIdaho enacted legislation. Marek, 112 Idaho at 866, 736 
P.2d at 1320; Public Law 280, 676 Stat. 588 (1953). Idaho enacted I.e. § 67-5101 to accept 
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jurisdiction in Indian Countrl over specific types or classes of disputes: compuls9ry school 
attendance; juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation; dependent, neglected and abused 
children; insanities and mental illness; public assistance; domestic relations; and operation and 
management of motor vehicles upon highways and roads maintained by the county or state, or 
political subdivisions thereof. Id. at 865-66, 736 P.2d at 1319-20. 
In Marek, 112 Idaho at 866, 736 P.2d at 1320, the defendant was charged with felony 
injury to children and the state was arguing that it had jurisdiction to prosecute him because I.C. 
§ 67-510 1 allowed for state jurisdiction over "[ d]ependent, neglected and abused children." The 
defendant argued that I.e. § 67-5101 conflicted with the Idaho Constitution and could not be 
effective unless the Idaho Constitution was amended to allow for jurisdiction over Indian 
Country" The Court stated: 
Hence, we hold that while our Constitution may have provided for 
congressional control and jurisdiction over Indian lands, it did not, 
and could not, prohibit the ceding of part or all of such control and 
jurisdiction back to states. Such ceding of partial jurisdiction and 
control was accomplished by the Congress if the state would 
consent to accept such jurisdiction and control by legislative 
enactment. Idaho did so accept that ceding by the Congress 
through legislative action. 
6 Indian Country means: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United 
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-
way running through the reservation, 
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether 
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state, and 
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including 
rights-of-way running thwugh the same. 
18 U.S.c. § 1151. This definition encompasses all Indian reservations within the United States. 
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Marek, 112 Idaho at 866, 736 P.2d at 1320. The Marek Court thus recognized that despite the 
Idaho Constitution's limitation on subject matter jurisdiction in Indian Country, this limitation is 
overridden by an act of Congress that cedes such jurisdiction to Idaho. In the case of I.C. § 67-
5101 Congress granted jurisdiction to Idaho if Idaho would enact legislation. While Congress 
has the authority to cede its jurisdiction back to Idaho, the structure of the Idaho Con~titution in 
placing absolute jurisdiction with Congress, and the Marek Court's interpretation of the 
Constitution, prohibit Idaho from exercising jurisdiction without an affirmative act by Congress. 
Congress has continued to take affinnative acts to cede its jurisdiction over Indian 
Country to states. Through 28 U.S.e. § 1360(a), Congress granted subject matter jurisdiction 
over civil causes of action in Indian Country to six states: Alaska, California, Minnesota (except 
the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), and 
Wisconsin. North Pacific Ins. Co. v. Switzler, 924 P.2d 839,843-44 (Or. App. 1996). Idaho has 
not been ceded general civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian Country. Other states can accept 
jurisdiction over both criminal offenses and civil actions under 25 U.S.e. §§ 1321 and 1322, but 
only with the consent of the Indian tribe. For an Indian tribe to consent to state jurisdiction there 
must be a special election with a majority vote in favor of jurisdiction. 25 U.S.e. § 1326. 
Consistent with Congress's approval, Idaho has enacted a blanket acceptance of subject matter 
jurisdiction over criminal and civil matters in Indian Country if the tribal goveming body 
consents to state jurisdiction. I.e. § 67-5102.7 In interpreting I.e. § 67-5102, this Court has 
The state of Washington enacted a similar statute and the Colville Tribe consented to state jurisdiction in 
1965. Confederated Tribes of Co/ville, 447 U.S. at 164 n. 32 ("The presence or absence of tribal consent is a 
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noted that "state court jurisdiction, if such exists herein, over the subject matter of the instant 
action must be derived by what, in effect, is a bilateral agreement between the state of Idaho and 
the Shoshone-Bannock Tribe to confer jurisdiction to the state courts." Boyer v. Shoshone-
Bannock Indian Tribes, 92 Idaho 257, 262, 441 P.2d 167, 172 (1968). Despite' Idaho's 
preparation for accepting jurisdiction, "Idaho cannot expand its jurisdiction without the consent 
of the affected Tribes." Knox v. State, 148 Idaho 324, 332, 223 P.3d 266,274 (2010). Idaho can 
gain jurisdiction over Indian Country within the state in three ways: (1) amending the Idaho 
Constitution; (2) under Marek through Congress taking an affirmative step in ceding jurisdiction 
to Idaho directly;8 or (3) under the current federal laws, with the consent of the tribe. 
"Because the state has the burden to establish its jurisdiction over an Indian in Indian 
country, and because jurisdiction exists only where the tribe consented, it follows that the state 
has the burden to establish that the tribe consented to its jurisdiction." State v. Major, 111 Idaho 
410,725 P.2d 115 (1986). In interpreting I.C. § 67-5101, the court in State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 
77,123 P.3d 710 (Ct. App. 2005), stated: "we must narrowly construe Section 67-5101(G) so as 
to minimize erosion of tribal sovereignty." I.e. § 67-5101(G)'s acceptance of jurisdiction for the 
operation and management of motor vehicles was not broad enough to encompass the crime of 
possessing methamphetamine discovered pursuant to a traffic stop. The Ambro court concluded 
rational basis for distinguishing among reservations"). The distinguishing factor here is that the Coeur d' Alene tribe 
has not consented to Idaho's jurisdiction over all civil matters or the regulation of tobacco sales. 
8 See also State v. Indian COUlmy Enterprises, Inc., 130 Idaho 520, 521, 944 P.2d 117, 118 (1997) 
(recognizing that Congress, through 40 U.S.c. § 290, ceded subject matter jurisdiction to the state to apply worker's 
compensation laws on reservations). 
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that "the state did not have subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute Ambro for the 
methamphetamine, which she possessed on the reservation." Id. at 83, 123 P.3d at 716. 
Subject matter jurisdiction, unlike preemption, is an issue that turns on state law and 
holdings by other jmlsdictions are not determinative. Confederated Bands & Tribes -of Yakima 
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 493 (nlling that federal statute does not require a state to amend its 
constitution but that "[i]f as a matter of state law a constitutional amendment is required, that 
procedure must - as a matter of state law be followed."). The state of Washington has a 
similar provision in its constitution that vests jurisdiction over Indian Country with Congress. 
The Washington Supreme Court ignored the plain meaning of its constitution and held that its 
legislature could repeal the Indian Country provision of its constitution with mere legislative 
action. Id. While the tribe argued that the Washington Supreme Comi's holding was incorrect, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held it would not interfere with that holding as it was a matter of state 
law. Id. n. 39. 
Idaho's Constitution is unique and is to be interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court. The 
Idaho Constitution prohibits Idaho from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Indian 
Country. The Marek holding allows Idaho to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Indian 
Country to the extent, and subject to the terms, that Congress expressly cedes such jurisdiction. 
Idaho has accepted subject matter jurisdiction over very limited types or classes of 'disputes 
under I.c.§ 67-5101, none of which are applicable here. Further, consistent with Congress's 
actions, Idaho is prepared to accept additional subject matter jurisdiction under I.C. § 67 -5lO2 if a 
tribe consents to Idaho's jurisdiction. Here, it is clear that Idaho has not accepted subject matter 
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jurisdiction over tax and tobacco related cases on Indian Country. Equally clearly, the Coeur 
d' Alene tribe has not consented to the state of Idaho exercising jurisdiction over the tobacco 
trade conducted on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. Accordingly, courts in the state of Idaho lack 
subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and the district court erred when it failed to grant NWS's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
4. Idaho Does Not Have Personal Jurisdiction Over NWS. 
The question of the existence of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is 
one of law, which the Supreme Court reviews freely. Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLe, 143 
Idaho 723, 726, 152 P.3d 594, 597 (2007). Idaho courts only acquire personal jurisdiction over 
non-resident defendants if two criteria are satisfied: (1) the non-resident defendant's actions fall 
within the scope ofIdaho' s long-ann statute; and (2) exercising jurisdiction over the non-resident 
defendant comports with the constitutional standards of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. Id. Satisfying the first criterion is a matter of state law; satisfying the second 
criterion is a matter of federal law. 
a) Idaho Long-Arm Statute. 
NWS asserts that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate it was subject to the long-ann statute. 
The long-arm statute is subject to the constraints imposed by the Idaho Constitution. Idaho's 
long-ann statute, I.C.§ 5-514(a), subjects any person or entity who engages in the "transaction of 
any business within this state" to the jurisdiction of the courts of Idaho. Additionally, the long-
arm statute imparts personal jurisdiction as the result of "the commission of a tortious act within 
this state." I.C. § 5-514(b). Plaintiffs only argue these two provisions of the long-arm statute 
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apply in this case. (R. p. 145) While the long-ann statute is "remedial legislation designed to 
provide a forum for Idaho residents and should be liberally construed to effectuate that purpose," 
Blimka, 143 Idaho at 726, 152 P.3d at 597, Idaho statutes cannot be broader than the Idaho 
Constitution. Lloyd Corp., 53 Idaho at 25 P.2d at 219 (Idaho Constitution is a limitation on the 
powers of the state); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 276, 108 P.3d at 423. 
In the present case, the record is empty of any conduct occurring in Idaho that could 
subject NWS to personal jurisdiction in Idaho under Idaho's long-ann statute. First, there is no 
evidence that NWS committed any tort within Idaho. Second, based upon this Court's holding 
that "sales occurring within the boundaries of an Indian reservation [are] not sales 
occurring within Idaho's domain," Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 62, 524 P.2d at 190 (emphasis 
added), NWS did not transact any business in the state ofIdaho. 
The record in this case is empty of any conduct occurnng off the Coeur d'Alene 
reservation in the state of Idaho that could subject NWS to personal jurisdiction in Idaho. 
NWS and Warpath are both owned by members of Indian tribes. The shipments in question 
went to Warpath's location on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. The contract was negotiated 
between two Indian-owned companies conducting their businesses in Indian CountrY.I:he mere 
fact the reservations do not touch each other does not subject these companies conducting inter-
reservation transactions to the personal jurisdiction of all states. Indeed, because NWS only 
contracted in the Coeur d'Alene reservation, NWS' s conduct did not occur in Idaho. Plaintiffs' 
request to have the long-ann statute read as reaching NWS is a request to disregard the Idaho 
Constitution and the Indian jurisdiction statutes that are clearly against such an interpretation. 
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b) Due Process Clause. 
1\TWS asserts that its wholesaling relationship with a Coeur d'Alene tribal member entity 
located on the reservation is an insufficient contact with the State of Idaho for Plaintiffs to 
maintain this suit under traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 
In Blimka, 143 Idaho at 727,152 P.3d at 598, the Court stated: 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution permits a state to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant when that defendant has 
certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." In determining 
the existence of minimum contacts, a court must focus on the relationship among 
the defendant, the fomm, and the litigation. Once a court finds the requisite 
minimum contacts, it must then proceed to determine whether its assertion of 
personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice. 
(citations omitted). Due process does not require the defendant's presence in the fomm state, but 
it prohibits an Idaho court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant 
unless certain minimum contacts exist. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. State of 
Washington, 123 Idaho 739, 744, 852 P.2d 491,496 (1993). The minimum contacts can be met 
if the defendant "purposefully directs his activities at residents of the forum state and the 
litigation arises out of or relates to those activities." Id. (quotation omitted). The contacts must 
show the defendant "purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Idaho 
and the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Idaho." Id. at 744-45, 
852 P.2d at 496-97. To evaluate whether personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions 
of fair play and substantial justice, courts are to look at factors such as: the burden on defendant; 
the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; plaintiffs interest in obtaining convenient 
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and effective relief; the interstate judicial systems' interest in obtaining the mos~ effective 
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 
In Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 123 Idaho at 744, 852 P.2d at 496, the state 
of Washington provided benefits to its out of state worker's compensation benefici.aries by 
paying their bills. When the beneficiaries residing in Idaho received care from Saint Alphonsus, 
a non-profit hospital incorporated in Idaho, Washington would send payment to Idaho. 
Additionally, Washington sent Saint Alphonsus a provider agreement. The Court concluded that 
"Washington's involvement with Idaho in the instant case was a function of the unilateral 
decision of some Washington workers to move or seek medical care out of state." !d. at 745,852 
P .2d at 497. It held that Washington did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and 
protections of Idaho law. Id. 
Similar to the long-arm statute analysis, in evaluating minimum contacts, the focus must 
be on non-reservation contacts with Idaho. Switzler, 924 P.2d at 848 (finding defendants that 
resided on the WaIm Springs reservation in Oregon had no contacts with the state that were 
purposefully directed at the state). Here, NWS has no contacts with Idaho directed off the Coeur 
d' Alene reservation. NWS has made the specific decision not to sell into Idaho and sells 
cigarettes marked "for reservation sale only." Plaintiffs posit that Idaho residents may have 
purchased Seneca and Opal brand cigarettes from Warpath.9 Any cigarettes wholesaled by NWS 
9 The only evidence the Plaintiffs have that any non-Indians purchased cigarettes from Warpath that had been 
wholesaled by NWS is the affidavits of Mark Ausman and Roderick Howard. CR. pp. 1165-66). On june 9, 2009, 
Ausman, a tax compliance officer for the Idaho State Tax Commission, bought one pack of Seneca cigarettes for 
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do not arrive within Idaho's jurisdiction because of NWS, nor because of any act by Warpath. 
Any cigarettes brought into Idaho's jurisdiction are a unilateral function of the consumer's 
actions and do not demonstrate purposeful availment on the part of NWS. These facts do not 
satisfy the Due Process Clause requirement that NWS be shown to have purposefully availed 
itself of the benefits and protections ofIdaho law before it can be haled into court. 
5. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment to Plaintiffs. 
In granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs, the district court relied heavily on the 
"Maybee decision. As discussed in section IV.A.1.b, supra, Maybee is not on point with the case 
at bar. Based upon its incorrect finding that Maybee is controlling, the district court's.analysis 
contained many errors and summary judgment must be overturned. 
The district court stated that NWS' s "activities in this case also constitute off-reservation 
conduct," the same as the defendant in Maybee. (R. p. 1072). As noted above, the defendant in 
IVJaybee sold cigarettes via the internet to customers throughout Idaho. The Maybee defendant's 
interaction with consumers not situated on a reservation was the "off-reservation" conduct that 
the Maybee Comi was concerned with. Here, NWS sold cigarettes to a single entity, awned by a 
Native American, that was situated on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. Indeed, there was no 
evidence that NWS sold or offered for sale any noncompliant cigarettes to any consumer off-
reservation. Therefore, NWS could not have conducted any "off-reservation" activities. It is 
$2.55 from Warpath on the Coeur d'Alene reservation in Plummer. (R. p. 192, Aff. of Mark Ausman). On 
November, 30, 2010, Roderick Howard, a tax compliance officer for the Idaho State Tax Commission, visited 
Warpath on the Coeur d'Alene reservation in Plummer and purchased on carton of Seneca 72's cigarettes for $23.25 
and one carton of Seneca 120's cigarettes for $23.80. (R. pp. 1165-66) (Aff. of Roderick Howard, Respondent's 
October 4, 2011 motion to augment the record). There are no allegations that NWS sold cigarettes to any other 
person or entity in Idaho or any entity off the Coeur d'Alene Reservation. (R. p. 121, Aff. of Arthur Montour); see 
(R. p. 1070; p. 192, Aff. of Mark Ausmen; Aff. of Roderick Howard, October 4, 2011 motion to augment). 
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respectfully submitted that the district court's reliance on Maybee was in error, and the court's 
reliance led to an incorrect determination in the present case. 
Below, NWS submitted that there was no proof of actual delivery or receipt of any 
cigarettes sold by NWS in Idaho, and argued that Plaintiffs have not presented proof that NWS 
actually delivered any noncompliant cigarettes in the state of Idaho. (R. p. 1070). In rendering 
its decision, the district court noted that the only evidence of record was invoices showing that 
"Warpath is the purchaser of the cigarettes" from NWS. (R. p. 1070). Based upon this 
evidence, the district court held that NWS' s "sales of noncompliant cigarettes to' a retailer 
located in Idaho demonstrates that (NWS] knew or should have known such cigarettes were 
intended for distribution in Idaho."Io (R. p. 1070). The district court, however, completely 
ignored that the retailer in question was located on a reservation and was owned by a tribal 
member. This district court also ignored that this Court has held that "sales occurring within the 
boundaries of an Indian reservation [are) not sales occurring within Idaho's domain." lv[ahoney, 
96 Idaho at 62, 524 P.2d at 190 (emphasis added). Based upon this holding and the fact that 
NWS only sold cigarettes to an entity located on a reservation, it is clear that the district court 
did not view the facts in the light most favorable to NWS. If it had, the district court would have 
found that there is no evidence of record that NWS sold cigarettes in Idaho. 
NWS next argued below that the sales in question were between tribal members. The 
district court disagreed with this assertion by quoting a United States District COUl1 from 
10 NWS submits that the district court erred in determining at the summary judgment stage that NWS "knew or 
should have known" that cigarettes were intended for distribution in Idaho. If anything, Rule 56, Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, mandates that any determination regarding what NWS might have known be interpreted in the light 
most favorable to NWS. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 36 
00399771.00 I 
Michigan. (R. p. 1071) (citing Baraga Prds., Inc. v. Comm'r, 971 F.Supp. 294,296 (W.o. Mich. 
1977)). However, tlus Court has previously held that businesses exclusively owned by tIibal 
members are considered Indians in analyzing whether Idaho can regulate the transaction. 
Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 61, 524 P.2d at 189 (holding state could not tax cigarettes sold by a 
business owned by Coeur d'Alene member). It may be understandable for the district court to 
look for authority out of this state for guidance, but it is clearly error for the district court to 
malee a ruling that is in direct contravention of a holding from the Idaho Supreme Court, which is 
exactly what occurred in this case. II 
Finally, NWS submits, as discussed in the next section, that the district cOUli erred in 
granting summary judgment by not finding that the doctrine of sovereign immunity and 
jurisdiction mandate that this case should be dismissed. However, even if that is no.1 the case, 
summary judgment was still not appropriate because the district court should have employed the 
balancing test set forth in Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, which is clearly a factual inquiry. 
The Bracker balancing test involves a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, 
federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to detennine whether in the specific 
II NWS anticipates that Plaintiffs will argue that State v. Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199 (Ok. 2010), is 
persuasive authority that supports the district court's rulings in this case. Such asseliion, however, would be 
misplaced because the Oklahoma Supreme Court was not bound by Mahoney. 
In rendering its decision the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically noted that the tribal land in question is 
"geographically within the State of Oklahoma." !d. at 208. The Oklahoma Supreme Court also found that tribal 
illlilllll1ity does not extend to businesses owned by tribal members. See id. at 210. In the present case, however, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has previously held that "sales occuning within the boundaries of an Indian reservation [are] 
not sales occurring within Idaho's domain," Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 61, 524 P.2d at 189, and that businesses 
exclusively owned by tribal members are considered Indians in analyzing whether Idaho can regulate the 
transaction. Id. at 61, 524 P.2d at 189. Had the Oklahoma Supreme Court been bound by Mahoney, its analysis and 
holding in Native Wholesale Supply, 237 P.3d 199, clearly would have been different. Thus the Oklahoma decision 
is not applicable in the present case. 
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context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law." Id. at 145. The district court 
in this case did not employ this test because the regulated conduct in this case "occurs off-
reservation." (R. p. 1072). This determination was clearly in error because the regulated 
conduct at issue occurs on-reservation. 
Had the district court employed the Bracker test, summary judgment could not have been 
entered in favor of Plaintiffs. The United States Supreme Court "has repeatedly emph-asized that 
there is a significant geographical component to tribal sovereignty, a component which remains 
highly relevant to the pre-emption inquiry." Id. at 151. Further, "[ w ]hen on reservation conduct 
involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the state's regulatory 
interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at 
its strongest." Id. at 144. This Court has noted that in analyzing any state statute it is crucial to 
determine: (1) whether the regulated conduct occurs on or off a reservation; (2) whether the 
party being regulated is a tribal member; and (3) if the conduct being regulated does occur on a 
reservation, whether State interests outside the reservation are implicated. Maybee, 148 Idaho at 
524, 533 P.3d at 1123. In this case, it is clear that the regulated conduct occurs on the Coeur d' 
. 
Alene reservation and that the party being regulated is a tribal member. Accordingly, Idaho's 
"regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-
government is at its strongest." The district court should have therefore determined Idaho's 
interest being implicated outside the reservation, which the district never did. Based on this 
reason alone, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Plaintiffs. 
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For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
Plaintiffs. Not only did the district court incorrectly rely on Maybee as being controlling, but the 
district court incorrectly found that the conduct in this case occurred off-reservation. Finally, the 
district court failed to employ the Bracker test to determine Idaho's interest in off-reservation 
conduct. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the district court's order granting summary 
judgment to the Plaintiffs should be overtumed. 
6. The District Court Erred in Dismissing NWS' Motion to Dismiss. 
At the outset, it should be noted that Idaho does not have subject matter juri~diction to 
hear this case based upon the arguments set forth in section IV.A.3., supra. Those arguments are 
incorporated herein by reference, and it is respectfully submitted that the district court erred in 
not granting NWS's Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Idaho lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
NWS's arguments relating to its Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Idaho does not 
have personal jurisdiction were also fully briefed in section IV.A.4., supra. Those arguments are 
also incorporated by reference in this section of this brief. However, NWS would also like to 
address why the district court erred in its ruling denying NWS' s Motion to Dismiss. 
Below, the district court found that it had personal jurisdiction over NWS because of the 
"amount of business" NWS conducted with Warpath, Inc., in Idaho. (R. p. 795). This-statement, 
however, fails to recognize that NWS did not conduct any business in Idaho. As stated by this 
Court in Mahoney, "sales occurring within the boundaries of an Indian reservation [are] not sales 
occurring within Idaho's domain." Mahoney, 96 Idaho at 62 524 P.2d at 190. Here, it is 
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undisputed that all of NWS' s sales occurred on-reservation. Based upon Mahoney, the district 
court clearly en'ed by finding that NWS conducted any sales whatsoever in Idaho. 
The district court also erred in its jurisdictional analysis by not applying the Bracker 
balancing test. Similar to its decision granting summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, the 
district court found that the MSAA and the Complementary Act "are not attempting to regulate 
activities taking place on [the] reservation, but rather off-reservation activities." (R. p. 796). 
The record is clear that the activities being regulated in this case are only on the Coeur d'Alene 
reservation. Therefore, the district court erred in denying NWS' s Motion to Dismiss. 
NWS did not transact business in Idaho or commit any tortious acts within the State of 
Idaho. NWS' s only conduct was with a tribal entity located on the Coeur d'Alene reservation. 
As such, NWS is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Idaho based upon Idaho's long-arm 
statute, 1. C. § 5-514( a). Similarly, NWS' s contact with a tribal entity on a reservation is an 
insufficient contact with the state of Idaho for Idaho to maintain this suit under the Due Process 
Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the district court erred when it denied 
NWS 's Motion to Dismiss. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING AN INJUNCTION AND CIVIL 
PENALTIES AGAINST NWS. 
On November 26, 2010, the district COUli determined that injunctive relief was 
appropriate under I.C. §§ 48-606(l)(b) and 63-2519. (R. p. 1078). The district court 
"pennanently enjoined [NWS] from selling noncompliant cigarettes in Idaho in violation of I.C. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 40 
00399771.00] 
§ 39-8403(3) and from engaging in business as a wholesaler without obtaining a valid cigarette 
tax permit in violation ofLC. § 63-2503(1)." 
On March 9, 2011, the district court issued an order imposing $214,200 in civil penalties 
upon NWS pursuant to I.C. §§ 39-8406(1) and 8403(3). 
A review of the district court's decision regarding the permanent injunction and civil 
penalties is a mixed question of law and fact. "Findings of fact made by the district court will be 
upheld where they are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." Sells v. 
Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 771, 118 P.3d 99, 103 (2005). "This Court freely reviews a district 
court's application of law to its findings of facts." Id. NWS incorporates the arguments and 
authorities presented above in challenging the injunction and civil penalties. If this Court finds 
that the district court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or denying 
NWS's Motion to Dismiss, then the injunction that the district court entered against NWS and 
the civil penalties the district court granted must also be overturned. 
C. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO 
PLAINTIFFS. 
On August 1, 2011, the district court granted Plaintiffs $33,993.75 in costs and attorney 
fees. This is incorporated in the August 17, 2011 Amended Judgment. The district court 
awarded the attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 39-8407(5). 
This Court reviews a district court's award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. 
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.C, 148 Idaho 638, 227 P.3d 568 (2010). To 
determine whether there is an abuse of discretion this Court considers whether: (1) the court 
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) the court acted within the boundaries of 
such discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) the 
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. NWS incorporates the arguments and 
authorities presented above in challenging the district court's award of attorneys' fees to the 
Plaintiffs. If this Court finds that the district court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment or denying NWS' s Motion to Dismiss, then the attorneys' fees that the 
district court awarded against NWS must also be overturned. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A faithful interpretation of the Idaho Constitution bars Plaintiffs from exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction over Indian Country. Here, all conduct Plaintiffs are attempting to regulate 
took place in Indian Country. While Marek can support exercising jurisdiction in Indian 
Country, the exercise of jurisdiction is only proper if sanctioned by Congress. The Plaintiffs 
have not met their burden in demonstrating that Idaho obtained subject matter jurisdiction 
otherwise. 
Alternatively, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the long-arm statute, which is 
restricted by the Indian Country provision in the Idaho Constitution, can encompass the Coeur 
d'Alene reservation. NWS's transactions were exclusively on the Coeur d'Alene reservation; its 
contacts on the reservation were insufficient to allow Idaho to exercise personal jurisdiction 
under the Due Process Clause. 
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Finally, Plaintiffs' regulatory effort is focused on Indian-owned entities and on-
reservation conduct. Plaintiffs' action is preempted by the Indian COlmnerce Clause and federal 
interpretation of the Constitution. 
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court granting Plaintiffs' 
request for summary judgment, granting Plaintiffs' request for a pennanent injunction, granting 
Plaintiffs' request for civil penalties, and granting Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees should be 
reversed. Likewise, the judgment of the district court denying NWS's Motion to Dismiss should 
also be overturned. NWS requests costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this J!i day of November, 2011. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 43 
00399771001 
EBERLE, BE~~" IN, KADIN" G, TURNBO, W", & McKL VEf;i{~HARTERED 
By /lJ'/ )·/11-
'da~r v' S~l A. Diddle; of the finn 
xtiameys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy ofthe above and foregoing document 
was served upon the following attorneys on November 14, 2011, as indicated below and 
addressed as follows: 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Brettt T. DeLange 
Office of the Attorney General 
PO Box 83702 
Boise, Idaho 83702-0010 
William Von Tagen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
State Tax Commission 
POBOX36 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0410 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 44 
00399771001 
rYj u. S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 334-4151 
rY] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax (208) 334-7844 
